In this issue we feature 6 current papers on the theme of social capital, chosen by Fabio Sabatini (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”):

1. An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games - Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.; Sutter, Matthia;
2. Network Effects in Internal Migration - Laszlo Lorincz; Brigitta Nemeth;
3. The Economic Preferences of Cooperative Managers - Alves, Guillermo; Blanchard, Pablo; Burdín, Gabriel; Chávez, Mariana; Dean, Andre;
4. Identity and Redistribution: Theory and Evidence - Sanjit Dhami; Emma Manifold; Ali al-Nowaihi;
5. Immigration, Social Networks, and Occupational Mismatch - Sevak Alaverdyan; Anna Zaharieva;
6. Ostracism in alliances of teams and individuals: Voting, exclusion, contribution, and earnings - Stephan Huber; Jochen Model; Silvio Städter.

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1. An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games Charness, Gary (University of California, Santa Barbara); Feri, Francesco (University of Innsbruck); Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. (University of Malaga); Sutter, Matthias (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and clustering within networks affect coordination in a challenging experimental game on eight-person networks. Free-form chat is enormously effective in achieving the nonequilibrium efficient outcome in our game, but restricted communication (where subjects can only indicate their intended action) is almost entirely ineffective. We can rationalize this result with a novel model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. This credibility is much larger with freeform message communication than with restricted communication. We are the first to model this credibility and show, both theoretically and experimentally, an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. We also provide a model of message diffusion, which indeed predicts that diffusion will be more rapid without clustering and is consistent with our data. JEL: C71 C91 D03 D85 Keywords: networks, clustering, communication, credibility, cheap talk, experiment Date: 2019–05 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12347&r=soc

2. Network Effects in Internal Migration Laszlo Lorincz (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Corvinus University of Budapest); Brigitta Nemeth (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) Previous studies have shown the impact of family, community, and ethnic networks on migration. Our research focuses on the role of social networks in Hungarian internal migration. We examine the factors determining out-migration rate from municipalities, and the factors influencing location choice by analysingmigration volumes on the municipality-municipality level. We measure social network effects by the migration rate of previous years, and by the intensity of user-user connections on the iWiW online social network (representing3.7million users) between two municipalities. The migration volumes and the characteristics of the municipalities are included in the analysis based on administrative data, and the distance between municipalities are indicated by the travel time. We analyselongitudinal data for the2000-2014 period, and cross-sectional models for the year 2014. Based on multilevel and fixed-effect regression models we show that both leaving and choosing municipalities is associated with network effects: the migration of previous years, and also the connections on iWiW social network influence the current migration rate, even after controlling for each other. JEL: R23 Keywords: chain migration, internal migration, network effects, online social networks, social networks Date: 2019–05 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1913&r=soc
3. The Economic Preferences of Cooperative Managers Alves, Guillermo (Development Bank of Latin America); Blanchard, Pablo (IECON, Universidad de la República); Burdín, Gabriel (Leeds University Business School); Chávez, Mariana (IECON, Universidad de la República); Dean, Andres (IECON, Universidad de la República) A growing body of research has been investigating the role of management practices and managerial behaviour in conventional private firms and public sector organizations. However, little is known about managers' behavioural profile in noninvestor-owned firms. This paper aims to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive behavioural characterization of managers employed in cooperatives.We gathered incentive-compatible measures of risk preferences, time preferences, reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 196 Uruguayan managers (half of them employed in worker cooperatives) and 92 first-year undergraduate students. To do this, we conducted a high-stakes lab-in-the-field experiment in which participants played a series of online experimental games and made incentivised decisions. The average payoff in the experiment was approximately 2.5 times higher than the average local managerial wage in the private sector. Our key findings are that (1) the fraction of risk loving subjects is lower among co-op managers compared to conventional managers, and (2) co-op managers appear to be more altruistic than their conventional counterparts. Interestingly, we do not observe significant differences between the two groups across other preference domains, such as impatience, trust, and reciprocity. JEL: C90 D81 J54 Keywords: risk-aversion, time preferences, altruism, reciprocity, trust, lab-in-the-field experiment, managers, cooperatives Date: 2019–05 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12330&r=soc
4. Identity and Redistribution: Theory and Evidence Sanjit Dhami; Emma Manifold; Ali al-Nowaihi We contribute to a growing literature on redistribution and identity. We propose a theoretical model that embeds social identity concerns, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), with inequity averse preferences, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We conduct an artefactual ultimatum game experiment with registered members of British political parties for whom both identity and redistribution are salient. The empirical results are as follows. (1) Proposers and responders demonstrate ingroup-favoritism. (2) Proposers exhibit quantitatively stronger social identity effects relative to responders. (3) As redistributive taxes increase, offers by proposers and the minimum acceptable offers of responders (both as a proportion of income) decline by almost the same amount, suggesting a shared understanding that is characteristic of social norms. (4) Subjects experience more disadvantageous inequity from outgroup members relative to ingroup members. JEL: D01 D03 Keywords: Social identity, prosocial behaviour, ultimatum game, fiscal redistribution, entitlements Date: 2019–04 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:19/04&r=soc
5. Immigration, Social Networks, and Occupational Mismatch Sevak Alaverdyan; Anna Zaharieva In this study we investigate the link between the job search channels that workers use to find employment and the probability of occupational mismatch in the new job. Our specific focus is on differences between native and immigrant workers. We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) over the period 2000-2014. First, we document that referral hiring via social networks is the most frequent single channel of generating jobs in Germany; in relative terms referrals are used more frequently by immigrant workers compared to natives. Second, our data reveals that referral hiring is associated with the highest rate of occupational mismatch among all channels in Germany. We combine these findings and use them to develop a theoretical search and matching model with two ethnic groups of workers (natives and immigrants), two search channels (formal and referral hiring) and two occupations. When modeling social networks we take into account ethnic and professional homophily in the link formation. Our model predicts that immigrant workers face stronger risk of unemployment and often rely on recommendations from their friends and relatives as a channel of last resort. Furthermore, higher rates of referral hiring produce more frequent occupational mismatch of the immigrant population compared to natives. We test this prediction empirically and confirm that more intensive network hiring contributes significantly to higher rates of occupational mismatch among immigrants. Finally, we document that the gaps in the incidence of referrals and mismatch rates are reduced among second generation immigrants indicating some degree of integration in the German labour market. JEL: J23 J31 J38 J64 Keywords: job search, referrals, social networks, occupational mismatch, immigration Date: 2019 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp1033&r=soc
6. Ostracism in alliances of teams and individuals: Voting, exclusion, contribution, and earnings Stephan Huber (University of Regensburg and UAS Augsburg); Jochen Model (UAS Augsburg); Silvio Städter (UAS Augsburg) Alliances often provide a collective good among their allies. This article offers laboratory experimental evidence that the possibility to vote for the exclusion of non-cooperating allies, i.e. ostracism, can be a powerful negative referendum to increase allies’ contributions to the collective good. However, it is found that ostracism does not necessarily increase earnings in a public goods game. In particular, it is shown that the ostracism mechanism is used differently by individuals. While ostracism increases contributions irrespective of the game is played with a alliances of individuals or teams as the decision makers, the earnings do not statistically significant increase in alliances of individuals. This result can be explained with different voting patterns. Compared to individuals, teams vote and in turn exclude significantly less in early periods but more in later periods of the game. Thus, negative earnings effects of ostracism, i.e., excluded players can neither contribute to the collective good nor receive from the collective good, are found to be less severe in alliances of teams. JEL: C91 C92 H41 Keywords: alliances, team decision, public good, collective good, ostracism, exclusion, experiment Date: 2019–01 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201901&r=soc ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── This nep-soc issue is ©2019 by Fabio Sabatini. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice. General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director at nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected. NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.