In this issue we feature 6 current papers on the theme of social capital, chosen by Fabio Sabatini (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”):

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1. Social Capital and Prosocial Behaviour as Sources of Well-Being - John F. Helliwell; Lara B. Aknin; Hugh Shiplett; Haifang Huang; Shun Wang
2. When Foul Play Seems Fair: Exploring the Link between Just Deserts and Honesty - Fabio Galeotti; Reuben Kline; Raimondello Orsini
3. Education, social capital and political participation Evidence from school construction in Malian villages - Pierre André; Paul Maarek
4. Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers? Haoran He; Marie Claire Villeval
5. Trust and Economic Performance: A Panel Study - Xin, Guangyi
6. Social Cohesion, Institutions and Public Policies: New Evidence from the MENA region - KASMAOUI, Kamal; ERRAMI, Youssef

1. Social Capital and Prosocial Behaviour as Sources of Well-Being

   John F. Helliwell

   Lara B. Aknin

   Hugh Shiplett

   Haifang Huang

   Shun Wang

 This paper surveys evidence documenting positive linkages among social  capital, prosocial behaviour, and subjective well-being. Whether in the  workplace, at home, in the community, or among nations, better and deeper  social connections, and especially higher levels of trust are linked to  higher subjective well-being, even beyond the effects flowing through higher  incomes and better health. Prosocial behaviour is also shown to be a robust  predictor of well-being in both correlational and experimental contexts.

 These two lines of research are connected, as prosocial acts are most likely  to increase well-being when they are delivered in ways that improve social  capital, and reflect intentional generosity free of either compulsion or  personal gain. We infer that these deep links between prosocial acts and  well-being have an evolutionary benefit in maintaining the quality of social  capital and thereby delivering cooperative human responses in times of crisis.

   JEL: I31 O57 P16 Z13

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23761&r=soc

2. When Foul Play Seems Fair: Exploring the Link between Just Deserts and Honesty

   Fabio Galeotti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

   Reuben Kline (SBU - Stony Brook University [The State University of New York])

   Raimondello Orsini (DAIS - Computer Science - Universita di Venezia - Ca' Foscari)

 The distributive justice norm of " just deserts " — i.e. the notion that one  gets what one deserves — is an essential norm in a market society, and  honesty is an important factor in economic and social exchange. We  experimentally investigate the effect of violations of the distributive  justice norm of " just deserts " on honesty in a setting where behaving  dishonestly entails income redistribution. We find that the violation of the  just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward dishonesty. We then  test a more general proposition that violations of just deserts induce  dishonesty, even in cases where dishonesty does not have redistributive  consequences. Our results confirm this proposition but only for cases in  which the v iolation of just deserts also entails income inequality.

   Keywords: Meritocracy, Equity, Dishonesty, Just Deserts, Experiment

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01579214&r=soc

3. Education, social capital and political participation Evidence from school construction in Malian villages

   Pierre André

   Paul Maarek (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)  Using a nationally representative household survey from Mali with  retrospective information on school supply, we estimate the effect of opening  new schools on education and on social capital formation. I compare the  difference in educational attainment between individuals below and above the  age of 9 at a school opening date using a quasi regression discontinuity  design. School openings increase school enrollment; they also increase the  participation in village associations and the involvement in local political  life. The effect on political participation is concentrated in the eldest  cohorts of the village with education, aged more than 40; this is not surprising: the eldest occupy a pivotal role in the social life of African  villages. Also, the effect of education is concentrated on individuals  belonging to a chief family of the village, so education seems to change  local political power inside the dominant group of the village.

   Keywords: Education, political participation, school openings, Mali

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2017-18&r=soc

4. Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?

   Haoran He (School of Economics and Business Administration - Beijing Normal University)

   Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS -

    Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)  We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how  teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal  less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team  decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who  decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality  aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they  anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social  preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has  little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and  non-anonymous interactions.

   Keywords: social image,experiment,Team,inequity aversion,preference aggregation

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00996545&r=soc

5. Trust and Economic Performance: A Panel Study

   Xin, Guangyi

 This paper critically reviews the current various measures of trust through  surveys/questionnaires and trust experiments. The main shortcoming from such  approaches is that the trust index produced from surveys and experiment are  ambiguous. Given these arguments, I use Factor Analysis technique to  construct a new trust index that account for indicators of degree of trust.

 Consequently, the rankings of countries in my index is more consistent  compared to the rankings of existing trust indices. Using the above, I  illustrate the panel analysis on the influence of trust on FDI inflows and  income inequality. Trust turns out to play a significant role on FDI inflows.

 With regard to income inequality, trust is more pronounced among the OECD  countries.

   Keywords: Trust; Economic Performance; FDI inflow; Income Inequality

   JEL: C23 D63 O11 Z13

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80815&r=soc

6. Social Cohesion, Institutions and Public Policies: New Evidence from the MENA region

   KASMAOUI, Kamal

   ERRAMI, Youssef

 This paper documents the effects of social cohesion and institutions on  public policies in the MENA region using the three-stage least squares (3SLS)  method for panel data to deal with the problems of simultaneity and  correlation of errors. Our main findings show that the impact of social  cohesion on public policies is strengthened only at high qualities of  institutions. In other words, there is a threshold effect of institutions  beyond which social cohesion has a positive impact on public policies.

   Keywords: Social cohesion, Trust, Institutions, Public policies, 3SLS

   JEL: H41 O10 O43

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80950&r=soc

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