NEP: New Economics Papers - Social Norms and Social Capital - 02-08-2014
In this issue we feature 9 current papers on the theme of social capital:
This issue of nep-soc is sponsored by the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy. They are looking for an economist (or related field) as a Post-Doctoral researcher in Munich, Germany. The application deadline is 30 August 2014.
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In this issue we have:
- The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation - Sergio Beraldo; Robert Sugden
- Disorder, Social Capital, and Norm Violation: Three Field Experiments on the Broken Windows Thesis - Keuschnigg, Marc; Wolbring, Tobias
- A Multilevel Path Analysis of Social Networks and Social Interaction in Neighbourhood - van den Berg, Pauline; Timmermans, Harry J.P.
- The Dark Side of Leadership: An Experiment on Religious Heterogeneity and Cooperation in India. - Keuschnigg, Marc; Schikora, Jan
- Social Networks on the Web in Real Estates in Portugal - Florentino, Teresa; Casaca, Joaquim
- Importance of Social Networks in Real Estate Brokerage - Chow, Yuen Leng; Ong, Seow-Eng
- Private provision of a public good: cooperation and altruism of internet forum users - Ros-Galvez, Alejandro; Rosa-García, Alfonso
- Do leaders affect ethical conduct? Giovanna d’Adda; Donja Darai; Roberto A. Weber
- Grammar of difference? Labour policies and social norms on work and gender in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, ca. 1800-1940 - Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk
Contents.
- The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation
Date: |
2014-07-18 |
By: |
Sergio Beraldo (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF) |
URL: |
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This paper offers a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and the evolutionary process selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. The dynamics of the model are investigated both theoretically and through simulations. |
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Keywords: |
Cooperation; voluntary participation; random payoffs |
JEL: |
- Disorder, Social Capital, and Norm Violation: Three Field Experiments on the Broken Windows Thesis
Date: |
2014 |
By: |
Keuschnigg, Marc |
URL: |
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Adding to the debate about the “broken windows” thesis we discuss an explanation of minor norm violation based on the assumption that individuals infer expected sanctioning probabilities from contextual cues. We modify the classical framework of rational crime by signals of disorder, local social control, and their interaction. Testing our implications we present results from three field experiments showing that violations of norms, which prevent physical as well as social disorder, foster further violations of the same and of different norms. Varying the net gains from deviance it shows that disorder effects are limited to low cost situations. Moreover, we provide suggestive evidence that disorder effects are significantly stronger in neighborhoods with high social capital. |
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Keywords: |
broken windows theory; disorder; field experiment; low cost situations; norm violation; social capital |
JEL: |
- A Multilevel Path Analysis of Social Networks and Social Interaction in Neighbourhood
- The Dark Side of Leadership: An Experiment on Religious Heterogeneity and Cooperation in India.
Date: |
2014 |
By: |
Keuschnigg, Marc |
URL: |
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We investigate voluntary contribution to public goods in culturally heterogeneous groups with a laboratory experiment conducted among 432 Hindu and Muslim subjects in India. With our specification of 'Leading by example' we test for an interaction effect between leadership and religious heterogeneity in a high stake environment. While cultural diversity does not affect contributions in the standard linear Public Goods Game, it reduces cooperation in the presence of a leader. Furthermore, we show that preferences for conditional cooperation are only prevalent in pure groups. In mixed groups, poor leadership and uncertainty about followers' reciprocity hinders the functionality of leadership as an institutional device to resolve social dilemmas. |
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Keywords: |
leading by example; conditional cooperation; reciprocity; religious diversity; public goods game |
JEL: |
- Social Networks on the Web in Real Estates in Portugal
- Importance of Social Networks in Real Estate Brokerage
- Private provision of a public good: cooperation and altruism of internet forum users
Date: |
2014-07-25 |
By: |
Ros-Galvez, Alejandro |
URL: |
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We run an experiment with users of internet message boards. We find that forum users cooperate more with partners of their own forum than with partners from a different forum but they are equally altruistic when they made a gift to a partner of their forum or from another one. We also find that individuals are more active in the forums, the more altruistic they are; however, we find no relation between activity in the forum and cooperation. These results suggest that the public good provided in internet forums is mainly provided by a group of unconditional altruistic group of users, and that the feeling of community supports the cooperation in that provision. |
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Keywords: |
internet forums; public good provision; altruism; cooperation |
JEL: |
- Do leaders affect ethical conduct?
Date: |
2014-07 |
By: |
Giovanna d’Adda |
URL: |
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We study whether leaders influence the unethical conduct of followers. To avoid selection issues present in natural environments, we use a laboratory experiment in which we form groups and assign leadership roles at random. We study an environment in which groups compete, with dishonest behavior enhancing group earnings to the detriment of social welfare. We vary, by treatment, two instruments through which leaders can influence follower conduct—prominent statements to the group and the allocation of monetary incentives. In general, the presence of active group leaders gives rise to significantly more dishonest behavior. Moreover, appointing leaders who are likely to have acted dishonestly in a preliminary stage of the experiment yields groups with significantly more unethical conduct. The analysis of leaders’ strategies reveals that leaders’ statements have a stronger effect on follower behavior than the ability to distribute financial rewards, and that leaders’ propensity to act dishonestly correlates with their use of statements or incentives as a means for encouraging dishonest follower conduct. |
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Keywords: |
Leadership, ethics, dishonesty, experiment |
JEL: |
- Grammar of difference? Labour policies and social norms on work and gender in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, ca. 1800-1940
Date: |
2014-07 |
By: |
Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk |
URL: |
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This paper investigates developments in labour policies and social norms on gender and work from the perspective of colonial entanglements. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, work was seen a means to morally discipline the poor, both in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies. A prime example are the initiatives by Johannes van den Bosch, who first in 1818 established 'peat colonies(!)' in the Netherlands, where the urban poor were transported to become industrious agrarian workers. In 1830, the same Van den Bosch introduced the Cultivation System in the Netherlands Indies, likewise, to increase Javanese peasants' industriousness. During the nineteenth century, ideals and practices of the male breadwinner started to pervade Dutch working-class households, and child and women's labour laws were issued. Instead, legislation in the Netherlands Indies was introduced very late and under heavy pressure of the international community. Not only did Dutch politicians consider it 'natural' that Indonesian women and children worked. What is more, they presented the inherent differences between Indonesian and Dutch women as legitimation for the protection of the latter: a fine example of what Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper have called a 'grammar of difference'. |
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Keywords: |
Social policy, Women's work, Child labour, Colonial history, Labour relations. |
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